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Introduction  
1.1 Topic  
When China signaled to the international community its aspiration to join the WTO 
and initiated the accession negotiation in the fall of 1986, few individuals realized the 
far reaching impact of this decision on China’s legal system. After numerous rounds 
of bilateral negotiations and ministerial negotiations covering a time span of 15 years, 
China was granted a seat proper in “the United Nation of world trade” in 2001. If this 
event could be viewed as an acknowledgment of China’s subscription to the WTO 
laws in letter, then China’s competency in implementing these laws turned out to be 
one of the hot topics in the many years that followed. From 2000 onwards, a wealth of 
literature surfaced detailing the influence of WTO on China. Among them, Magarinos, 
Long and Francisco (2003) provide a one-stop reference point for the general 
relationship between the WTO and China. Chan (2009) uses his work to illustrate the 
policy impact of the WTO regime on China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) 
regulation. Two books from Chen, Duncan (2010) and Song, Chen (2006) focus on 
the prospect of Chinese agriculture in the post-WTO era. In contrast to these single 
volumes, a considerable amount of articles in recent years have also appeared in 
academic journals, detailing the influence of the WTO legal regime upon the China’s 
trade laws reforms in the post-WTO era. The internal logics of these articles vary, but 
the majority of the scholarship tends to portray China in a recipient position of 
international treaty. This kind of narrative style, however, is both self-explanatory and 
simplistic. Self-explanatory because as the main seat of authority in international trade, 
the WTO figures prominently in harmonizing international trade laws and monitoring 
their enactments in the member states. Simplistic in that it tends to eclipse the roles 
and functions of diverse actors from the member states in the process of 
implementation and legal reforms. Factors such as sate authority and corporate actor 
are all important determinants in both the assimilation and actualization of WTO trade 
laws and rules. These factors do not necessarily reflect identical interests all the time 
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and the interplay between them under many circumstances contribute to different 
patterns of legal reforms. Different areas of legal reforms, different timing of legal 
reforms and different targets of legal reforms are just few examples. The current 
literature which prioritizes the role of supernational factor thus faces the issue of 
credibility due to their understudy of these influential factors.  
 
My research is partly inspired by the recent development in the theory of regional 
integration. Traditionally, two schools of theories: neo-functionalism and 
inter-governmentalism are used to explain the progress of regional integration. They 
are at variance with each other in their emphasis on the key momentum behind 
regional integrations. Neo-functionalism tends to underline the role of supernational 
and subnational actors, while the inter-governmentalism highlights the personal 
choice of national leaders and national government. This traditional dichotomy, 
however, increasingly loses ground as recent researches reveal that policymaking 
actually happens simultaneously at subnational, national and supernational level 
(Solis, 2010, p.214). My research follows the same line of argument by granting the 
foreground to actors at national and sub-national level. By doing so, this research 
aims to complement the WTO-centered literature to gain a better understanding of the 
post-WTO legal reform in China.  
 
1.2 Research question  
To what extent does China’s accession to the WTO lead to domestic legal reforms? 
The mandate of WTO enables it to induce substantial changes in the legal system of 
its member states. Currently, the bulk of WTO laws concentrate on the regulation of 
three aspects of global trade, i.e. transnational trade of goods and service, foreign 
investment (FDIs) and trade related intellectual property rights (TPIPR). This research 
focuses on China’s trade laws reform in the backdrop of its entry into the WTO.  
 
1.3 Central Argument  
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Following the pluralistic approach, my central argument is: in the process of 
localization of WTO laws in China, legal reform (the effect variable) is seldom 
attributable to the existence of a single causal variable (the sufficient and necessary 
cause). Rather, my corollary is that the WTO-related legal reforms result from the 
influences of multiple factors with each of them warranting individual examination. 
This research identifies four such constituents. State preferences and costs of entry are 
two factors falling in the authority of national government. Corporate actor represents 
the influences from industry which has a vested interest in trade liberalization. Local 
norm system is included to examine WTO-induced legal reforms in light of 
accommodation between local and foreign norms. Finally, this research also attempts 
to create some generalizable conclusions of these factors in the diffusion of 
international laws. For this end, I use the method of cross-national comparison in the 
qualitative research tradition.  
 
1.4 Layout of the thesis  
This research paper is divided into seven parts. The Introduction Section provide an 
overview of the research background and acquaints readers with the research question. 
The second section is used for literature review, where I provide a brief account and 
evaluation of alternative explanations of China and Japan’s WTO compliance 
behaviours. The fourth section details the multilevel governance theory and justifies 
its applicability to the current research. In the fifth section, four hypotheses are 
developed from the four factors in the central argument section. In the sixth section, 
the influence of the four factors in China’s post-WTO trade laws reforms is 
concretized by operationalization: a process in which a concept is firstly converted to 
variables and then to indicators. The seventh section is used for the cross-national 
comparison and is divided into four parts. In each part, different aspects of China and 
Japan’s post-WTO trade laws reform are analyzed by paying attention to one causal 
variable. The eighth section concludes the paper.  
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What other academicians say about the topic – a pool of 
alternative explanations from selected peer-reviewed journals 
As an integral part of critical social inquiries, researchers are asked to take into 
account his peers’ ideas. The topic of WTO-induced legal reforms is multifaceted in 
nature and here I concentrate on two aspects. This review is divided into two parts. 
The first part concerns alternative propagation mechanism of WTO laws. The second 
part relates to alternative causal variables for a state’s decision to use WTO dispute 
settlement machinery.  
 
The communication mechanism of WTO laws is an important, yet rarely canvassed 
area of WTO-induced legal reforms. In most literatures on WTO-induced trade laws 
reforms, the communication mechanism of WTO laws and rules are rarely tackled. 
For many, it is a futile question. The communication of WTO laws and regulations are 
thought to take place naturally through official documents such as WTO Agreement 
and Protocol of Accession. It is only until recently that some researchers begin to 
acknowledge the involvement of civil society in this process. 
 
In his study on the disseminations of the rule of laws and other WTO principles in 
China, Kellogg’s study contends that civil groups may facilitate this process (2012, 
p.53). The term “civil” is used here mainly to denote two kinds of groups. The first 
kind is activist groups dedicated to promoting the rule of law. As Chinese government 
turns from indoctrinator of ideology to regulator of economy, Chinese society 
becomes much freer than before. Meanwhile, grassroots groups which subscribe to 
Western rule of law gain in power. These groups are instrumental in spreading the rule 
of laws and other WTO principles in China.  
 
The second kind comprises senior intellectuals like academicians and legal 
professionals. Compared with the first group, its role in acquainting China with WTO 
rules are more direct and influential. In China and Japan, government sets up advisory 
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bodies to enhance quality of legislations and policymaking. China’s State Council, for 
example, convenes experts in international laws and trade for consultation on an 
irregular base. The attitude of these experts on WTO principles like trade 
liberalization and marketization is considered an important formative factor in 
WTO-induced legal reforms.  
 
Another aspect of WTO-induced legal reform concerns a member state’s adoption of  
WTO’s dispute settlement machinery. As an integral part of the WTO Agreement, 
member states are expected to use WTO adjudication to solve their trade disputes. For 
this end, the GATT and the succeeding WTO provides a comprehensive legal 
framework known as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Meanwhile, studies 
indicates states’ inclination to use WTO arbitration vary markedly across countries 
(Naoi, 2009, p.421).). In this research, I contribute a state’s adoption of WTO legalism 
mainly to corporate actors’ interest. Other factors uncovered by this research like 
diplomatic relation are also crucial determinant. In the second section of this review, I 
will briefly discuss the impact of international relation in this regard.  
 
International relations between WTO members could be used to predicate their 
attitude towards WTO adjudication. Davis & Shirato (2007, p.276), for example, 
argues that a state is more likely to resort to WTO DSM against the other if their 
diplomatic relation is amicable. Conversely, a state is unlikely to resort to WTO DSM 
against the other if their diplomatic relation is tense. To support this argument, they 
use Japan as an example. 
 
From 1995 to 2002, Japan filed eleven cases at the WTO and seven of them are 
against the USA. In contrast, Japan filed no complaints against China albeit “there 
were several clear examples of (China’s) WTO-inconsistent policies” (Davis & 
Shirato, 2007, p.312). In explaining this discrepancy, Davis and Shirato highlight 
Japan’s diplomatic relations with these two states. In the case of the USA, Japan is 
said to “have little fear that a WTO dispute will disrupt bilateral relations given the 
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strong alliance between the two countries” (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p.297). In 
comparison, Japan is very cautious about initiating WTO actions against China in 
view of the fragile diplomatic relation between these two countries (Davis & Shirato, 
2007, p.306). As a matter of fact, Sino-Japan relation is historically troubled by issues 
like treatments of WWII legacies and territorial disputes.  
 
The multilevel governance model: a pluralistic perspective of 
transnational governance  
As mentioned in the introduction section, my central argument is based on the 
multiple-causality mechanism, which relates China’s trade laws reforms to multiple 
factors. In this research, I acknowledge not only the steering role of international 
organization like the WTO, but influences from factors at national and subnational 
level. To better account for this viewpoint, this research implements the multilevel 
governance theory.  
 
3.1 Two variants of multilevel governance  
In their retrospective work on the evolution of multilevel governance, Hooghe & 
Mark (2003, p.11) equate the concept of multilevel governance with polycentric 
governance, a term used initially in the metropolitan management in North America. 
As the only example of supernational authority, the rise of the EU helps expand the 
utility of this concept from public management to international relations. In the EU 
context, multilevel governance is originally employed to describe EU structural policy. 
“a system of continuous negotiations among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers – supernational, national, regional and local”  that was distinctive of EU 
structural policy. Since then, the scope of this concept has gradually expended to 
encompass the EU as a whole (Hooghe & Mark, 2003, p.3 & p.4). Today, 
transnational governance is accepted as a generic term and used for varied purposes 
(Hooghe & Mark, p.11).  Hooghe & Mark also envision two variants of multilevel 
governance, which are termed as type I and type II.  
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Type I finds its intellectual foundation in federalism, which features power allocation 
amidst a limited number of governments at limited levels. Generally speaking, the 
structuring of this kind of multilevel governance feature general purpose jurisdictions, 
which means each level of authority is matched to bundled and politically related 
responsibilities. Its membership is nonintersecting, which means the boundaries 
between the upper and lower level of membership (which is usually territorial) do not 
intrude into each other. It normally only features a limited levels of governments but 
its internal structure and jurisdiction, once settled, are expected to last for a long 
period of time. Last but not least, the jurisdiction of this kind of multilevel governance 
usually follows the model of trias politicas, which included legislature, executive and 
a court system (Hooghe & Mark, 2003, p.8)  
 
In contrast, type II embraces many levels of jurisdictions and each level many 
task-specific jurisdictions. This arrangement is designed to ensure the principle is 
served by multiple, competitive agents in an attempt to enhance efficiency. Its 
memberships include probable interpenetrations between higher and lower 
governments. Finally, this variant of multilevel governance promises greater 
flexibility in operations due its pliable structure design (Hooghe & Mark, 2003, p. 10- 
p.11).  
 
3.2 WTO trade laws reforms through the lens of multilevel 
governance, a brief analysis 
Through the comparison of the two models, I contend that WTO-induced laws 
reforms could be better understood in light of type I.  
 
In the first place, type I multilevel governance concentrates on bundled policies. The 
term “bundle” means relevant and interconnected. It further distributes jurisdictions 
within limited levels of governments. In the context of this research, the bundled 
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policies mainly encompass WTO laws on transnational trade, FDIs and TPIPR (Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights). This governance process involves primarily 
three tiers of governance: the institution at Geneva which spells out the laws, Beijing 
government entrusted the responsibility to restructure its legal systems and domestic 
industries which have a say in trade laws reforms. Here I include the corporate actors 
as a constitutive of governance by reference to Engma’s study (2006, p.168). 
According to him, the interaction between corporations and their counterparts should 
not be viewed as “a one-way street” in which corporations may only response 
reactively to extrinsic stimulus. In reality, corporation may actively participate in the 
governance process either through presentation or lobbying. The final element of this 
process is local norm systems, which may contribute to or hamper the localization of 
international laws. As argued by Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p. 21), the 
analysis of transnational institutional change should not only concentrate on the 
interactions between institutions but on the cultural and normative forces which shape 
the process in a more nuanced and diffusive manner. 
 
In the second place, the diffusion of WTO laws does not blur the traditional boundary 
between supernational and national authority. In the process of enactment of WTO 
laws, each member of this governance still retains its original identity. Both the case 
of China and Japan confirm this viewpoint.  
 
In the third place, type I multilevel governance is noted for the stability of its structure 
and jurisdiction. The longevity of WTO and its predecessor GATT (General 
Agreement of Trade and Tariff) attest to this viewpoint.  As one of the first policy 
moves made by the UN to coordinate international trade, GATT serves the world 
without interruptions from 1947 to 1944. When the GATT was upgraded to GATT 
1994, it becomes an integral part of the WTO Agreement. Today it is safe to say that 
no other institutions with similar authority and scope of jurisdiction like WTO would 
emerge in the foreseeable future.  
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Finally, the jurisdiction of WTO follows the tripartite political system, which confirms 
Hooghe and Mark’s judgment. Corresponding to the legislature is the WTO 
Ministerial Conference, which deliberates principles of international trade and passes 
new laws. In the position of executive stands the Director-General (the current holder 
of this position is Mr. Pascal Lamy). WTO also installs quasi-court system to arbitrate 
over trade disputes between its member states. This is commonly known as the 
Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Hypotheses 
The type I model of multilevel governance lays down the base for four hypotheses, 
which correspond to the four independent/causal variables in the central argument 
section: 
Firstly, I posit that there is a degree of fit between the imported laws and the Chinese 
political milieu. Specifically, the more these WTO laws align with China’s current 
policies and practices, the more likely they materialize by legal reforms.  
 
Secondly, I posit that there is the issue of adjustment cost. In this research, it is used to 
measure political and fiscal prices incurred by the Chinese government and economy. 
Specifically, the less disturbing and undesirable this transitional process is, the more 
likely WTO laws would be assimilated into the Chinese legal order,  
 
Thirdly, I posit that different industries have divergent interests in WTO-induced legal 
reforms. Specifically, the more internationally oriented an industry, the more likely it 
will endorse WTO-induced legal reform. Also, the more institutionally dominant and 
financially privileged an industry, the more likely the legal reform would be carried 
out in its interests,  
 
Fourthly, I posit that the more the WTO rules are in line with Chinese local normative 
values, the more likely they result in legal reforms.  
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In sum, state preferences, costs of entry, corporate actors and norms system constitute 
the four independent variables. The dependant variables are different aspects of 
reforms in China’s international trade regime. In this research, legal reforms include 
not only revisions of China’s current legal order but new legislations in line with the 
WTO standards. The installation of anti-dumping and anti-subsidies laws is one 
example.  
 
From being abstract to concrete, the process of 
operationalization 
State preferences  
In the four independent variables listed above, state preferences and costs of entry are 
concepts traditionally relating to national authority. In the context of WTO-induced 
trade laws reforms, state preferences is used to describe the varying degree of 
importance state authority attach to different areas of legal reforms. State preferences 
could be normative in nature as states comply consciously with international laws. 
State's preference could also be pragmatic as state authorities use the compliance of 
WTO laws as a policy vehicle to solve pressing domestic issues. In the latter case, 
state preferences are frequently granted to those legal reforms which have the most 
potential to serve the national interests. Logically, the concept of state preferences is 
operationalized with two variables: high importance and low importance.  
High importance can be further concretized with three indicators in the different 
stages of legal reforms: in the negotiation phase leading up to the WTO membership, 
high importance typically translates into greater concession and shorter grace period. 
These are common tokens of a state's willingness to initiate legal reforms in a certain 
direction. In the actual implementation of WTO treaty, high importance usually leads 
to significant revisions of current legal order and rapid legal reforms. Conversely, low 
importance usually leads to limited concession and longer adaptation period. In the 
actual implementation of WTO treaty, low importance retards the WTO-induced legal 
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reforms.  
 
Costs of entry  
In his article detailing the implication of international organizations on their member 
states, Wang (2004, p.477) maintains "the choice made by members of the 
international community are all made with costs". In this research, costs of entry 
means the various interests and privileges that a member state of the WTO 
relinquishes to gain access to the harmonized international market. For the 
operationalization of this concept, I propose three variables to mirror the cost incurred 
by a member state at the economic, institutional and political levels. Economic costs 
are usually rooted in the obligatory opening of domestic markets and the dismantling 
of former protectionist mechanisms. They are typically tangible and quantifiable. In 
contrast, institutional costs are associated with the human and financial resources a 
state commits in overhauling its legal system and restructuring its administrative 
institutions. Finally, accession to the WTO also mandates constitutional revisions in 
some (though not all) member states. This frequently happens in cases where a 
member state still lacks the legal infrastructure to honour its commitment to the rule 
of laws and free market economy.  Theoretically speaking, there is reverse 
correlation between costs of entry and actualization of legal reforms. i.e. high costs of 
entry retard legal reforms while low costs of entry speed up legal reforms. As a 
consequence: retarded legal reform and accelerated legal reform could be used as 
indicators in this research.  
 
Corporate actors 
To further appraise the roles of subnational players in WTO-induced legal reforms, 
this research uses corporate actor as one example. Corporate actors are a sector of 
industry, whose common interests, ability for collective action and clout with regard 
to national economy enable them to exert considerable influence in the course of 
WTO-induced legal reforms. Much scholarship on political economy maintains a 
distinction between export-oriented industry and import-competing industry due to 
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their divergent interests in trade liberalization (Solis, 2010, p.210, Naoi, 2009, p.423). 
Generally speaking, industry which is large in size, has a high degree of concentration 
and a high degree of trade/export dependence tends to lend strong support to 
WTO-induced legal reforms. This may urge government to legalize its trade 
regulations in light of WTO rules. It can also play a catalytic role in the government's 
choice of the WTO Trade Settlement Dispute Mechanism to facilitate its expansion 
overseas. In contrast, import-competing sector is more inclined to rely on 
protectionism and governmental stewardship to safeguard its fragile standing and 
interest in the domestic market. Thus, the concept of corporate actors is 
operationalized with two variables: export-oriented industry and import-competing 
industry. Promotion or hindrance of (WTO) legalism is used in the analysis section as 
indicators to measure these two variables.   
 
Local norm systems 
As an organization committed to the liberalization of international trade, the rule of 
laws and transparency are two quintessential norms underpinning the WTO system. 
WTO-induced legal reforms could accordingly be interpreted as a process of local 
reception and assimilation of international norms. Local norm systems are viewed as a 
causal factor here as norm systems in different states display different capacities to 
absorb these Western liberal ideas. This research attempts to analyses the 
implementation of WTO norms in the context of local cultural and political tradition. 
Two variables: compatibility and incompatibility are used to address different degrees 
of complementarity between local and international norms. Compatibility between 
local and WTO norms can translate into indicators such as inclusive observance of the 
WTO Agreement and complete legal reform. Incompatibility between local and WTO 
norms is usually associated with indicators like partial observance of WTO treaty and 
incomplete legal reform. 
 
Below is a chart to present the operationalization process in a graphic way.  
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     Concept        Variables      Indicators  
      
 
 
State preferences  
 
 
     
1. High importance 
 
2. Low importance  
 
1) greater concession in 
trade regulation; 
2) shorter grace period; 
3) hefty legal reforms  
 
       
 
 
Costs of entry  
    
1.Political costs  
 
  2. Institutional costs 
 
   3. Economical costs 
 
 
(when the cost are high)  
No legal reform or 
incomplete reform,  
(When the costs are low) 
Relatively complete legal 
reform,  
      
 
Corporate actors  
 
1. Export-oriented 
industry 
2. Import-competing 
industry  
 Export-oriented industry 
prompts the adoption of 
WTO legalism  
Import-competing industry 
impedes the adoption of 
WTO legalism   
         
 
 
Local norm systems   
 
 
1.Comptibility between 
local and WTO norms 
2. incompatibility between 
local and WTO norms 
(Compatibility)  
Inclusive observance of 
WTO treaties and 
complete legal reforms  
(Incompatibility)  
Partial observance of WTO 
treaties and incomplete 
legal reforms  
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Analysis  
6.1 Standards of case selection and case collection 
 
Based on the research design and the qualitative research method, this research 
purports to explain key causal mechanisms underlying China’s post-WTO legal 
reforms by four sets of cross-societal case studies. The total number of cases is eight 
(four for China and four for Japan). The standards of case selection should fulfill the 
following requirements to maximize the legitimacy of analyses: 
 
Firstly, cross-national case study in general is organized around the comparison of 
identical industrial sectors to generalize outcome. In this research, this rule would be 
respected with the exception of costs of entry study. In it, the juxtaposition of several 
sectors in China and the agriculture sector in Japan is illustrative because they reflect 
the differing competencies of the Chinese and Japanese polity to weather the 
transition costs.  
 
Secondly, the selection procedure should heed whether the case is sufficiently 
representative to deduce generalizable conclusion.  
 
Thirdly, the selection procedure should heed whether the selected cases are unduly 
concentrated on a certain aspect of legal reforms. The dispersion of cases is more 
favourable than monolithic utilization of one aspect of Chinese/Japanese trade laws 
reforms to reach final conclusions.  
 
Based on the three criteria of case selection, the legal reforms to internationalize 
China and Japan’s financial service sectors in light of the GATS are chosen to 
exemplify the significance of state preferences in WTO-induced trade laws reforms,  
 
China and Japan are burdened to a different degree by their accessions to the WTO. 
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As a developing state lacking many essential features of free market economy, China 
is in face of a transition cost much higher than Japan. Multiple sectors of Chinese 
economy: agriculture, manufacturing and service were expected to pay dearly in the 
initial few years after China’s accession to the WTO. In comparison, WTO Agreement 
mainly affects the interests of Japan’s inefficient agriculture. The second section will 
evaluate China and Japan’s WTO compliance behaviours in light of these costs. 
 
Literature on political action has long since recognized the influences of corporate 
actors in building international trade order. This research further proves corporate 
actors also figure importantly in the localization of international laws. Motivated by 
desires to maximize their sectoral interests, corporate actors may exert strong 
influence on a state’s post-WTO legal reforms. The codification of anti-dumping laws 
in China and the adoption of legalism in Japan are used to demonstrate the roles of 
corporate actors in this process.  
 
Finally, WTO-induced trade laws reforms is also a process of accommodation 
between domestic and international norms. A state’s WTO compliance behaviour 
could partly be explained by the local norm system’s ability to absorb trade 
liberalization principles of the West. In this research, two norms of liberalism tradition: 
transparency and the rule of laws are selected to evaluate the roles of local norm 
systems in China and Japan’s post-WTO trade laws reforms.  
 
6.2 State preferences 
China 
Background brief 
In retrospect, nowhere else is China’s resolution to embrace the global trade regime 
more manifest in its restructuring of the financial service sector. Although the 
liberalization of international trade of service was incorporated into the WTO regime 
only at the Uruguay round in the mid 1990s, China quickly turns to one ardent 
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advocate of liberalization of trade of service. This could be partly affirmed by the 
extensive obligations contained in the Schedule of Specific Commitments on Service, 
an appendage document to the Protocol of China’s Accession (Kim, 2002, p. 435). 
 
In terms of the scope and range of China’s market access commitment to foreign 
provisions of financial service, WTO extracted from China far more concessions than 
from most advanced economies (Qin, 2003, p.729). In the realm of securities market, 
foreign securities traders are allowed to own 33 percent ownership in joint-venture 
fund management companies and their holding may further increase to 49 percent 
after three years upon the mutual agreement of partners. Foreign security underwriters 
are also promised 33 percent initial holdings in joint-venture investment banking 
industry to underwrite domestic securities under the principle of national treatment. 
Meanwhile, their rights in trading securities denominated in foreign currencies are 
legalized. The liberalization of Chinese insurance industry also renders foreign 
participants immense business prospect by gradually phasing out restrictions on 
locations and products. They can now underwrite large-scale risks such as satellite 
launching and possess maximally 50 percent of shares in life insurance companies. In 
non-life insurance market, foreigners can retain shares up to 51 percent and open 
subdivisions. The legal reform in Chinese commercial banking represents another 
breakthrough: within two years upon China’s accession, more foreign banks were able 
to engage in limited retail banking both in RMB and foreign currencies. By the year 
of 2006, foreign banks were finally accorded national treatment like their domestic 
counterparts. Any lingering restrictions on locations and customers of foreign banking 
are banned once for all (Ji & Thomas, 2002, p. 680, Qin, 2003, p.730). These 
provisions are unusual in nature also because they are typically granted only to 
favourable trading partners in FTAs. 
 
Analysis  
To account for China’s manifold obligations in the areas of financial service, 
relatively reduced adaptation period, I would like to grant the primacy to state 
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preferences. In order to establish a correlation between the causal variable (state 
preferences) and effect variable (China’s post-WTO legal reforms in trade of financial 
service), process tracing will be employed to examine the evolution of China’s 
financial service regulations. In this research, process tracing is not used to unearth 
the principle of equifinality. As expressed in the central argument, state preferences is 
considered as one necessary condition variable, which helps partly explain China’s 
post-WTO legal reforms. Rather, I would like to count on the process tracing as a 
multiple checking system to underpin a number of theoretically predicable 
intermediary institutional changes (Checkel, 2005, p.15). If I could prove state 
preferences feature constantly in every stage of the legal reform process, then it would 
be safer for me to establish the causal mechanism. The same analysis methodology is 
also applicable in the case of Japan.  
 
Modern securities transaction took off in china in late 1990s when China set up two 
securities exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen (one Economic Special Zone in 
China). According to Wong (2006, p.389), the rationale behind China’s decision to 
open securities market is to recruit capital “through the marriage of capitalism and 
socialism” Securities exchanges in China primarily function as fundraising vehicle to 
support the SOEs (State Owned Enterprises).    
 
Meanwhile, Chinese government also began to issue a few governmental and 
companies bonds to finance its deficits and infrastructure projects. Non-governmental 
participations in the securities market remained low even in 2001, with only 20 
percent of the total listed shares are tradable. The bulk of shares are either held by 
governments or legal persons (Ji & Thomas, 2002, p.675 & 676). China’s securities 
and bonds markets have long been recognized as policy markets. The fluctuations and 
prospects of these markets do not reflect actual performance of companies but 
government’s perception of certain companies’ utility in fulfilling its policies. As a 
result, there is a general lack of transparency and proper legal frameworks to offer 
shareholders protection against insider trading and manipulations (Ji & Thomas, 2002, 
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p. 676).  
 
To build a more specialized and market-oriented insurance sector, China firstly 
divested the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) from the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) in 1984. As the only state owned insurance company, the dominating 
status of the PICC was preserved well into the 1990s. Compared with China’s 
decisive opening up of other areas of national economy, Chinese government assumes 
a rather cautious stance regarding the entry of foreign underwriters. Back then, it only 
franchised few foreign insurance contractors to participate in China’s domestic 
insurance business and subjected them to onerous checks and limitations regarding 
services and investment options. All these practices seriously restricted foreign 
agents’ operations and profitability (Ji & Thomas, 2002, p. 676).  
 
In terms of China’s banking industries, relative more progresses were made in the 
early 1980s. By 1985, an independent banking system emerged from the shadow of 
planned economy. It includes one central bank and nine district branches. Meanwhile, 
Chinese government made efforts to commercialize its banking system. In this context, 
“commercial” means making the operations of banks more sensible to profits and 
losses instead of commands from government (Ji & Thomas, 2002, p. 677). 
 
Despite undergoing significant transformation in the 1980s and 1990s, China’s 
banking sector is widely recognized to be one of the weakest links of the national 
economy. Compared with robust reforms and marked progresses in agriculture and 
industry, the performance of China’s commercial banking is under par. Its potential to 
support the national economy is far from being realized. Transnational study shows 
that banking in china was still a state monopoly; the range of their products is limited 
and quality of their service is poor. Meanwhile, the policy role assigned to large state 
owned banks to finance unproductive SOEs resulted in mounting non-performing 
loans. The cumulative levels of NPL from the four largest state-owned banks in the 
fourth quarter of 2001 reportedly reached RMB 1.8 trillion. This equals to 26 per cent 
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of their loan portfolios and 20 per cent of China’s GDP (Ji & Thomas, 2002, p.678).  
 
One inference from the information above highlights the curtailing effects of China’s 
hybrid political economy and the nascent nature of China’s financial service sector. In 
face of the escalating competitions from abroad in the post-WTO era, the fate of 
China’s financial service hinges on China’ efforts to press ahead with legal and 
regulations reforms (Ji & Thomas, 2003, p. 679). Theoretically, this could be further 
elaborated with the aid of Wang’s two waves of reforms in economic globalization 
theory. In his article detailing the impact of WTO on state sovereignty, Wang (2004, p. 
475) divides the process of economic globalization into two stages. The first wave is 
called the first generation reform and the second the second generation reform. 
According to him, the unanimous adoptions of market economy by most members of 
the international community constitute the first generation reform while the 
establishment of legal framework for the fulfillment of market potential constitutes 
the second. Viewed in this perspective, the quintessence of China’ WTO strategy is to 
use WTO-induced legal reforms (the second generation reform) to advance domestic 
economy reforms (first-generation reform). Also, China’s decisions to adopt and 
transplant WTO laws and norms were made at the initiative of Chinese government 
itself (Wang, 2004, p.477). This reverse interpretation and operationalization of 
economic globalization theory is striking both in its novelty and uncertainty. This 
finding is also confirmed by many other researches. Kim (2002, p.439), Qin (2007, p. 
721), Thomas & Ji (2002, p.673) all highlight Chinese leaders’ reliance on increased 
foreign competition to vitalize China’s financial service industry. Premier Zhu Rongji, 
for example, believed China’s financial industry would benefit from the WTO due to 
inflows of foreign talents, expertise and capital. He was generally credited with the 
substantial concessions China made during the negotiations (Thomas & Ji, p.679 & 
682). 
State preferences may also have a direct bearing on the efficiency of China’s 
post-WTO trade laws reforms. Decisive trade laws reforms under the auspice of state 
authority may drastically alter former practices and change the trade environment in 
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China. As a consequence, foreign traders often benefit enormously from business 
opportunities which previously deny them. One such hallmark event is Huarong Asset 
Management Company (a subdivision of the ICBC)’s public auction of distressed 
state assets in 2004. For the first time in history, foreign establishments were allowed 
to bid vis-à-vis Chinese firms under the principle of national treatment. Finally, $ 1.3 
billion were sold to a group headed by Morgan Stanly (Ji & Thomas, 2003, p. 678). 
 
Japan  
Background brief 
Compared to China’s belated admission into the WTO, Japan joined the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955. After it approved the expanded 
GATT agreement in 1994, it became a member of the WTO six years ahead of China 
in 1995 (WTO, 2013, “Membership information” section, para.1).  Unlike China, 
which is widely considered to be an authoritarian state (Lai, 2010, p. 820, Dimitrov, 
2008, p. 24, Fukuyama, 2008, para.7), Japan today is a stable democracy in the form 
of constitutional monarchy. The real rulership is accorded to the Prime Minister, who 
must command sufficient support from the Diet (parliament of Japan) to govern. To 
correlate Japan with China is expected to amplify the weight of explanations. If a 
hypothesis on post-WTO legal reforms is verified both in China and Japan, the 
underlying mechanism could be strengthened. If under some circumstances 
divergences do occur, they provide the starting point for further investigation.  
 
In 1996, partly as a signal to honour Japan’s commitment to the GATS (General 
Agreement of Trade in Service), Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced Japan 
would embark on drastic financial liberalization. Under the motto of “modern, 
international and transparent”, this Japanese “big bang” proposed a legal overhaul of 
the financial service industry. It is five years in duration (1996-2001) and covers 
virtually all significant financial institutions and their operations. Foreign exchange 
rules, for example, were amended to allow more flexible outflow of foreign currency. 
Japanese depositors can now take advantage of foreign banking to earn higher 
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interests. Rules regarding cash inflows were revised to facilitate market entry of 
foreign capital. In the securities sector, many new measures were institutionalized to 
create a level playing ground and to stimulate competitions. These measures include: 
extensive decontrols of brokerage commission, bigger selection of over the counter 
financial products, relaxed regulations on trading of financial derivatives and 
decreased transaction costs of securities. In the insurance sector, local and foreign 
contractors were guaranteed more autonomy in pricing policy and products design. 
Finally, Japan would significantly lower the threshold of market access by 
dismantling restrictions on new financial institutions, including financial holding 
companies (Lincoln & Litan, 1998). These legal reforms are expected play a crucial 
role in enhancing international competitions and reestablishing Tokyo as a global 
financial center.  
 
Analysis 
Under the influence of mercantilism, Japanese government maintained a heavy 
regulation and control of the financial service industry well into the 1970s. Changing 
economic condition at the end of that decade, however, increasingly led some liberal 
politicians to challenge the virtue of the old system. As a consequence, administration 
over foreign currencies was eased and operations of banks gradually expanded 
(Lincoln & Litan, 1998). However, many big commercial banks in Japan used this 
opportunity to exploit real estate and soon engaged in impudent lending. Their 
discretion is believed to fuel the rampant speculations in stock market and real 
properties market during the 1980s. When the bubble finally bursted in 1990, major 
banks in Japan were saddled with mounting non performing loans and their 
reputations tarnished. This crisis provided additional fodder to the reformists in the 
Diet. They claimed the chance to avoid long-term recessions hinges on the 
restructuring of Japan’s financial service. This objective could be achieved by means 
of marketization and increased foreign participations. Since GATT 1947 does not 
provide any explicit guidelines for foreign provision of service (especially financial 
service), Japanese financial market is traditionally less internationalized than London 
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and New York. After Japan’s ratification of the GATS as a part of the GATT 1994, 
liberals such as Ryutaro Hashimoto quickly seized it as instrument to advance their 
policies (Lincoln & Litan, 1998).  
 
In this research, it is easy to identify WTO-induced trade laws reforms partly with 
state preferences. Japan’s obligation to honour the WTO Agreement also opens a new 
window for leading politicians to exercise influence over the course of domestic 
politics. Besides, the utilitarian role of these legal reforms in solving domestic issues 
is very clear. In his study on shifts of national norms, Goldstein (as cited by Cortell & 
Davis, 2005, p.24) suggests failures of current practices or institutions as key 
incentive for elites to seek remedy in new norms. If his theory is sensible, then the bad 
debt fiasco in the 1980s surely provided the decision makers internal condition and 
stimulus to upgrade Japan’s financial service industry. When they eyed international 
organizations for improved legal templates, the WTO provided the GATS as a policy 
option. In conclusion, the meaning of Japanese Big Bang is twofold: in the domestic 
setting, it is legal revisions in Japan’s regulatory institutions and style. In the external 
setting, it is in line with the spirits of GATS. As a legal reform, Big Bang mainly 
resulted from state preferences while WTO played a secondary and normative role in 
the process.  
 
6.3 Costs of entry 
 
China’s (and to a similar degree, Japan’s) decision to embrace a highly competitive 
international trading regime is not without costs, and in many circumstances it leads 
to pains during the transitions. In this research, costs of entry are the price paid by 
WTO member states in return for their access to the global market. In the hypothesis 
section, I forecast there is a negative correlation between costs of entry and 
WTO-induced trade laws reforms. In other words, big costs of entry impede or inhibit 
legal reforms while small costs of entry stimulate legal reforms. To facilitate analysis, 
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I operationalize this concept to three variables by stratifications, i.e. the economic 
costs, the institutional costs and constitutional/political costs. 
 
The economic costs is a variable used to quantify those perceptible, measurable 
economic losses a state incurs. Intensified market competition, flooding of foreign 
products, pressures from trading partners to widen imports while moderate exports 
can increase economic costs.  
 
At the intermediary level is the institutional costs. A state must possess sufficient 
financial resources and institutional capacity to launch WTO-induced legal reforms. 
This variable is used to map these costs.  
 
Finally, entry to some (though not all) international organizations mandates significant 
changes in the constitutional order or basic political arrangement of the entrant state. I 
here use the variable of constitutional costs. The WTO, for example, could constrain 
substantively a state’s authority to legislate and tax through the national treatment and 
other requirements (Wang, 2004, p.477). 
 
China 
Background brief 
China’s obligation to the general WTO Agreement and its commitments to various 
WTO-plus clauses in the Protocol make it to pay a much higher price than other 
developing countries. In terms of economic cost, China was predicated to sustain 
heavy losses due to removals of product subsides and import quotas on agricultural 
products. The Development Research Centre of China’s State Council (as cited by 
Kim, 2002, p.451) predicated around 10 million (3.6 per cent) of total agricultural 
labours would lose jobs within seven years after China’s accession to the WTO. 
Meanwhile, 18 per cent of the agrarian lands would be out of production. Traditional 
manufacturing industries such as machinery, automobile and petrochemicals were hit 
especially hard during the process. Due to overlapping investments, widespread 
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inefficacy and flooding of quality products from abroad, these sectors totally 
registered a new unemployment population of half a million (Kim, 2002, p. 451). 
Most conservative estimate of the total bankruptcy ratio of SOEs reached 10 per cent. 
China’s service industry also faced mounting pressure of survival with the elapse of 
the grace period. China was expected to pay dearly in the financial service sector. The 
failure of many insolvent banks, securities firms and insurance companies in face of 
intense international competition were inevitable (Qin, 2007, p.682, Kim, 2002, p. 
452). This may lead to lose of market shares and laying off of Chinese personnel. The 
ceasing of policy support roles of banks to many underperforming SOEs was also a 
political concern as it may result in social instability. Finally, China’s acquisition of 
the WTO membership also finalizes the full convertibility of ranminbi (RMB, China’s 
legal tender) in capital transaction. This will increase the susceptibility of RMB to 
market uncertainties such as volatile exchange rates, speculative attacks and future 
financial crisis (Kim, 2002, 452). 
 
For institutional costs, the Protocol requests China, inter alia, “to administer in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner of all the laws and regulations and so on 
governing trade and goods and service, trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights and foreign exchange”. It requires china to establish a registration system of 
possible infringements of WTO regime. It requires China to redouble its efforts to 
improve transparency in legislations and administration. Finally, the Protocol also 
implies the necessity for China to establish a judicial review system (Potter, 2001, 
p.599). To meet these requirements, it is necessary for China not only to amend many 
rules of regulations, but commit considerable resources to restructure the current 
institutions and bureaucracy. 
 
Besides these economic and institutional costs, China is obliged to revise some 
clauses of the constitution to ensure it will not collide with the GATT. In particular, 
China has to reconsider the Article 12 of the constitution which guarantees the 
Communist Party of China (CPC)’s leadership in the legal system. This constitutional 
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change also has spillover effects for many interpretative documents and speeches. It 
also requires the deletion of “socialism” or “socialist” from the Chinese definition of 
the rule of law as long as these terms connote an infringement of GATT’s authority.  
The transparency requirement of GATT disallowed the opaque internal decision 
making process of the CPC in the regulating trades. Meanwhile, the current 
superiority status accorded to public property also needs revision according to the 
national treatment principle (Potter, 2001, p.603).  
 
Analysis 
As mentioned above, “China’s accession to the WTO requires fundamental revisions 
to virtually all aspects of its legal and regulatory systems” (Potter, 2001, p.607). In 
order to fulfill its commitments to the WTO Agreement and the Accession Protocol, 
China mobilized a daunting amount of resources to reconstitute its administrative 
laws and substantive laws. This extensive legal overhaul encompasses customs, 
foreign exchange, taxation, intellectual property rights, enterprise, bankruptcy, pricing 
and other areas of international trade (Potter, 2001, p.602). If quantity could be used 
as an indicator of China’ progress so far, it is apparently laudable as “more than 2,500 
commercial laws and regulations were reassessed after May 2002, 830 were abrogated 
and 335 were amended, while the National People’s Congress undertook to draft 118 
new laws” (Choukroune, 2012, p. 10).  
 
Based on China’s progress in this regard and positive feedbacks from many foreign 
establishments, it seems the high costs of entry do not pose a prohibitive burden on 
China’s WTO legal reforms (Choukroune, 2012, p.12). The legal reforms were 
conducted in a stepwise fashion and their implementations generally remain in the 
right track charted by the government. According to the hypothesis, there is a negative 
correlation between costs of entry and legal reform. This hypothesis, however, is not 
particularly applicable in China. To explain the discrepancy between hypothesis and 
reality, I here give two explanations.  
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Firstly, china’s WTO-induced legal reform did not start from scratch. For over two 
decades, china has been working unilaterally in building a market-oriented economy 
(Qin, 2007, p.721). During this period, rudimentary legal foundation was lay down to 
make international trade better serve the national economy. China Foreign Trade Law, 
for example, was firstly introduced in 1994 and underwent further amendments in 
2004 to reflect the WTO requirements (“China Foreign Trade Law,” 2005, 
“Preamble”, para.1). China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law only came into effect in 2006, 
but its origin dated back in 1986, when China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Trial 
version) was published. Although considerable efforts were put in to forge a 
market-oriented, rule-based trade legal system in the 1980s and the 1990s, China’s 
legal system is widely flawed for the lack of judicial independence and fragmented 
structure (Choukroune, 2012, p.10). In this sense, the WTO-induced legal reforms 
serve as an accelerator to modernize China’s legal system.  
 
Secondly, the CPC continuously presides over legislations through its Party 
Committees. Objectively speaking, there are two sides of the story. On the positive 
side, the CPC’s dominance in the legislatures ensures the legal reforms be carried out 
in an efficient, coordinated and highly unified way. In China, legal reforms 
concerning international trade typically necessitate consultations and cooperations of 
diverse departments. They include: Department of Treaty and Law in the Ministry of 
Commerce, various ministries of the State Council, Legal Affair Bureau of the State 
Council and Legal Affair Committee in the National People’s Congress. China’s status 
as a party state exempts its legislation from fraction interest prevalent in democracy. 
Although the Protocol forbids the CPC to impinge on GATT’ authority in 
international trade, it has no competency to require the CPC to retreat from making 
laws. On the negative side, efficiency often prevails over transparency and China’s 
performance in the latter regard is mediocre at the best. Some authors (Lai, 2010, p. 
826-827, Choukroune, 2012, p. 12,) also highlight the failure of the WTO in helping 
establish the rule of law in China.  
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Japan  
Background brief  
In contrast to China’s sweeping legal reforms, Japan displayed a markedly less 
capacity to sustain costs of entry. In this research, I use the abortive trade 
liberalization of Japan’s agriculture as one example.  
 
From the middle of 1960s, Japan began to remove tariffs incrementally. As a result of 
the Kennedy Round Negotiation (1964-1967), it further reduced the tariff rates in the 
1970s. Meanwhile, Japan slashed the number of industries under the protection of 
import quotas from 122 to 72 (Cortell & Davis, 2005, p.12). As a consequence of 
these moves, Japan’s tariff rates for most industrial products are the lowest in the 
developed world. However, Japan’s sensitivity towards different sectoral interest 
results in a highly asymmetrical pattern of liberalization. One example concerns the 
disparity between tariffs for industrial products and agricultural commodities. To cite 
one example: according to Japan’s tariff schedule on April 1, 2012, Japan charged no 
tariff on imported vehicles and accessories. In comparison, it charged a stunning tariff 
of 778 percent for imported rice. This means every kilogram of rice is subject to a 
tariff of 150 Japanese Yen (“Japan’s tariff schedule as of January 1, 2013,” 2013, 
Section XVII, “Vehicles, aircrafts, vessels and associated transport equipment”). In 
fact, Japan managed to preserve an embargo on foreign rice well into the 1990s. Even 
after the ban was lifted in 1993, Japan still heavily privileges domestic producers by 
subsidies and quota system. The Rice Farming Income Stabilization Programme, for 
instance, protects rice farmers by predetermined pricing standard. Should the 
domestic market price fall behind this standard, it compensate farmers the difference. 
Besides, quota system is also in effect. Currently, the quota for yearly rice importation 
is 682,000 tons. In sum, these laws and regulations are efficient to isolate a highly 
uncompetitive domestic sector from world market. However, they contravene the 
comparative advantages principle at the heart of trade liberalization. At the GATT 
level, Japan’s refusal to liberalize its agriculture constituted one reason for the 
collapse of GATT negotiation in 1990. WTO negotiations at Cancun later fell apart 
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also for this reason (Cortell & Davis, 2005, p.17). 
 
Analysis 
According to Davis and Shirato (2007, p. 284), agriculture has long been the bone of 
contentions in international trade and creates the largest number of disputes. This rule 
also holds in Japan. Theoretically speaking, liberalization of Japan’s agriculture would 
benefit almost everyone in the international trade arena. On the domestic front, it 
benefits the Japanese society as a whole as consumers can purchase much cheaper 
rice from abroad. Japan’s government can also be eased of its burden to finance the 
disadvantaged agriculture. On the international front, it facilitates the shift of 
production of rice to states with higher yield efficiency. My research indicates the 
major obstacle to liberalization of Japan’s agriculture lies in the unaffordable politic 
price in face of Japanese government. For a better understanding of the stranded legal 
reforms of agricultural trade in Japan, I give special attention to powerful faction 
interest.  
 
Japan’s agriculture is a small but influential actor in Japanese politics. The interest of 
Japan’s agriculture is crystallized in Japan’s Agricultural Cooperative Organization 
(JA). Thus far, Japan’s legislation on agricultural trade is said to reflect the “collusive 
relationship” between the government and the lobbying of JA at the expense of 
Japanese consumers (Mulgan, 2012, p. 16). JA exercises its leverage in Japanese 
politics mainly by representation in the legislature and participation in administration 
of agriculture (Mulgan, 2012, p. 15).  
 
In the first place, former cadres and members of JA enter the Diet as policy brokers to 
uphold JA’s interests. By doing so, they ensure JA’s opinions and preference being 
heard and integrated in the legislation process. As a return, JA provides campaign 
subsidies, financial contributions and voting. In the 2010 Upper House election, for 
example, JA provided endorsement to 16 JA candidates. It also successfully installed 
Akira Gunji, a former district secretary-general of JA in the Minister office of the 
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Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). Many JA members also function as rank 
officials in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Besides, virtually all 
political parties in Japan need the five million votes of JA members to survive 
(Mulgan, 2012, p.15).  
 
In the second place, JA can function as an adjunct to the bureaucracy and is frequently 
tasked with administrative functions in agriculture and trade. This differentiates JA 
from other pure lobbyist groups. In the middle of 2000s, for example, MAFF 
authorized JA to charge out rice production adjustment programme, including the 
setting of maximal production volumes. This policy is geared directly to keep market 
price high by restriction of domestic output. It is also common for MAFF to heed JA’s 
concerns and interests in its formulation of agricultural policies (Mulgan, 2012, p.15)  
 
According to Mulgan, (2012, p.16), JA’s interest lies in restricting production outputs 
and promoting small, inefficient and part-time agricultural farms. By restricting 
volume of supply, JA aims to keep the price of rice afloat in domestic market and 
extract more marketing commissions from farmers. By maintaining an inefficient and 
dispersed production system, JA intends to enlarge membership contributions and the 
base of support. For Japan, to align its agricultural policy with the demands of the 
WTO requires legal reforms. However, JA’s influence in Japan’s legislature and the 
LDP make any legal reforms to change the status quo extremely costly. Here I 
highlight one lesson from the 1980s.  
 
From the middle of 1980s, Japanese government under Noboru Takeshita began to 
face mounting pressure to liberalize agricultural trade. In 1987, US filed several 
GATT complaints against Japan’s quota system and won. This leads to Japan’s 
elimination of quotas on ten out of twelve agricultural products. This moderate 
concession, however, triggered heated controversies at home and the LDP (Japan) had 
to pay an extraordinary price for its decision. In the 1989 election, the LDP (Japan) 
lose its dominance at the Upper House. Since then, Japanese government reverted to 
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the old hard-line policy and contended basic foodstuffs should be exempt from import 
liberalization. Countries relying heavily on import of staple foods, it argued, need to 
maintain self-sufficiency in the interest of national security (Cortell & Davis, 2005, p. 
16). Since then, the basic political arrangement between JA and LDP (Japan) remains 
unchanged. As a result, legal reforms to liberalize agricultural trade are not likely to 
take off with this old pattern still in place.  
 
6.4 Corporate actors  
The last few years witness an expansion in the scope of corporate governance study. 
Traditional literatures in this field tend to concentrate on how to make agent 
(manager) accountable to principle (owner). In his essay on this topic, Engwall 
(2006, p.161) proposes an expanded paradigm. It encompass not only the internal 
management of business institutions, but the interrelations between businesses and 
other societal actors like government, NGO, media and local community (Djelic & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006, p. 161). According to him, corporate actors are not merely 
recipients of instructions from other regulative actors. Corporate actors may also 
assert their interest in the political process either by presenting favourable images 
(presentation) or campaigning (lobbying). My research follows this line of reasoning 
and credits corporate actors as influential contributors to China’s post-WTO trade 
laws reforms.  
  
China  
Background brief  
With a customer base of 500 million, Europe is a highly lucrative market for home 
appliances manufactures. Each year, around twenty-five million television sets are 
sold in Europe, among which ten to fifteen units are imported from non-European 
states. China’s TV producers imported the first batch of TVs to Europe in the middle 
of 1980s. Thanks to their mature technology and low-cost labour, TVs made in China 
soon flooded into the European market. This caused alarm in the twelve member 
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states of the EU and they jointly filed a complaint against the alleged dumping of 
Chinese TVs. EU began to probe this issue in 1988 and imposed a 15.3 per cent 
anti-dumping tariff on TVs from China. This rate is later heightened to 25.6 percent in 
1995 and 44.6 percent in 1998. The final rise in tariff actually barred all Chinese TV 
from European market.   
 
China’s TV producers then began a long and arduous legal battle to reopen European 
Market. Among their strategies are lodging appeals at Brussels and designating China 
Chamber of Commerce of Machinery and Electric Products (CCCMEP) to engage in 
bilateral negotiations with the EU. In 1999, Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronics Co. 
made an unprecedented move when it hired a Belgian law firm, Van Bael & Bellis to 
battle for its interest. It sued EU for its abuse of China’s incomplete market economy 
status and distorted methods in calculating dumping profit margins. In April 2002 the 
two parties finally reached a deal: CCCMEP and 7 other Chinese TV manufactures 
consented to the import quotas and floor prices set by Brussels. The EU allowed 
China to market a limited number of TVs in Europe in return (“Nine Chinese TV 
producers face up to anti-dumping complaint,” 2000, para.3-10).  
 
Analysis  
The final agreement is an incomplete victory for China’s TV industry as the quota 
system and tariff remained in place. This case, however, is unique in that it spanned 
the time period before and after China’s accession to the WTO. During this period, 
Chinese TV industry quickly learns how to cope with foreign trade barriers within the 
legal framework of WTO. This case also highlights corporate actors as a vital factor in 
multilevel governance. Due to the rise of transnational jurisprudence, the interactions 
between corporate actors and their regulatory counterparts far transcend national 
boundary. In the case above, Chinese TV industry as a subnational actor deals with 
CCMEP (bureaucracy at national level), foreign law firm (intermediary at 
international level) and the EU (authority at supernational level) to reform current 
legislation.  
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The TV case, along with numerous other anti-dumping complaints against China, 
plays a catalytic role in establishing China’s own anti-dumping regime. Like 
European continent laws, China’s legal system relies predominately on prescribed 
legal corpus. Legislature in China traditionally grants little emphasis on case laws. In 
the last few years before China’s access to the WTO, soaring number of transnational 
trade dispute rendered many of its legislations obsolescent. Meanwhile, the 
inefficiency of China’ old legal system to protect national interest was all the more 
evident. Because of foreign dumping, China was reported to lose $ 35 million 
annually in the 1990s (Qin, 2007, p.72). China passed two laws regarding 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidies in 1997 and further merged them into a unitary law in 
2001 (Qin, 2007, p.72). Although it is exaggerating to attribute this legal reform 
exclusively to Chinese corporate actors, it is right to acknowledge the formative role 
of corporate actors in the legal reform.  
 
Japan  
Background brief  
From the mid 1990s, Tokyo took concrete steps to legalize its foreign trade regime in 
line with WTO principles (Pekkanen, 2004, p.135). During this period, Japan 
increasingly relies on legalism to constrain its major trade partners and safeguard its 
interests. In this context, legalism means a state’s adherence to the legality of WTO 
laws and active utilization of WTO arbitration to crack foreign trade protectionism. 
Compared with bilateralism Japan traditionally used before the WTO, this change 
constitutes a crucial element of Japan’s post-WTO trade laws reforms.  
.  
Before the advent of WTO, Japan seldom resorted to international laws in solving 
transnational trade disputes. During the entire GATT era 1(1947-1994), Japan in total 
filed four complains, the majority of which were settled at bilateral stage (Pekkanen, 
2004, p.137). Japan’s interest in formal trade dispute settlement mechanism firstly 
appeared at the concluding phase of the Uruguay Round. In 1995, the first year WTO 
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came into function, Japan filed its first complaint against the USA. From 1995 to 
2002, Japan was involved in 11 cases as complaint or third party. For many, Japan’s 
record in this regard spoke volumes of Tokyo’s WTO-centered trade strategy. 
Meanwhile, the evolution of Japan’ legalism reveals the logic of its domestic political 
economy. In Japan, trade laws reforms is an area especially under the sway of 
powerful corporate actors (Pekkanen, 2004, p. 135).  
 
Analysis 
In the hypothesis section, I assume different industrial sector may display different 
attitude towards WTO-induced legal reform. The export-oriented industries, for 
example, may press ahead with this process due to their vested interest in trade 
liberalizations. I further assume an industrial sector’s standing in national economy 
has a direct bearing on government’s decision to initiate legal reforms. In other words, 
an economically dominant and financially privileged industrial sector may commit 
more resources to promote WTO-induced legal reforms. To substantiate this causal 
mechanism, I firstly create a set of criteria. The aim of these criteria is twofold: to 
mirror the relative importance of industrial sectors and their varying influence on 
government’s trade laws reforms.  
 
Here I first turn to study of corporate political action. Empirical studies indicate an 
industrial sector’s willingness to petition for political action hinge on several factors. 
Among them, industry size, consolidation degree, competitiveness and 
export-dependence are especially important. Davis & Shirato’s research (2007, p.281) 
shows this rule is also valid for an industrial sector’s capacity to demand WTO 
arbitration.  
 
Then I integrate two additional explanatory variables which are unique in Japanese 
politics. In Japan, it is normal for industrial sector to win policy priority by cultivating    
political clientelism. Accordingly, an industrial sector’s relation with government and 
its political donations to the ruling LDP are included as two additional causal 
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variables.  
 
Then I evaluate the interest and potential of major industrial sectors in Japan to 
influence government’s adoption of legalism. The method is to filter them through the 
seven criteria listed above. In conclusion, I find three sectors of Japan’s 
manufacturing industry: steel, automobile and electronic have the most potential to 
petition for WTO adjudication:  
 
Why the steel industry is chosen: 
The steel industry of Japan has a moderately diversified structure and a medium level 
of concentration. As the third biggest steel corporation in the world, Nippon Steel 
Corporation (NSC) is the principle player in this field. In domestic market, traditional 
customers of the steel industry include automobile and automotive accessories 
industries, machinery and shipbuilding. From 1980s onwards, the competition levels 
of Japan’s steel industry slackened due to protracted depression in demand and limited 
profitability. Globally the steel industry of Japan remains one of the top contenders 
and Asian market is its primary export destination. China, Taiwan, South Korea and 
Thailand routinely place large quantity of orders with Japan. In 2001, Japan’s steel 
industry claimed a 10.4 percent share of the world market and 5 percent of the total 
value of Japan’s export (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p.299). Politically speaking, the steel 
industry is viewed by many as the most privileged sector within the manufacturing 
industry. It enjoyed Tokyo’s support from as early as the Meiji period and maintains a 
close liaison with the METI (Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry) in the 
postwar years. Due to economic security reason, METI historically regards the steel 
industry as a strategic sector and is all too willing to be at its service. Compared with 
other industrial sectors, Japan’s steel industry is particularly active in championing the 
use of WTO platform to combat trade barriers (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p.305). 
Institutionally speaking, the steel industry exerts its influences mainly through the 
Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF). The steel industry also cements its relation 
with the ruling LDP by regular political donations. In 2002, its political contribution 
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to the LDP amounted to JPY 142 million (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p. 288).  
 
Why the automobile manufacturing is chosen:  
Japan’s automobile manufacturing is structured with a medium-high level of 
concentration. Three big corporations: Toyota, Honda and Nissan partition the 
majority of domestic market. Toyota, with its market share of 35 percent in 
comparison with Nissan’s 13.7 percent and Honda’s 11.8 percent in 2004, is the 
market leader. From 1990s to early 2000s, the automobile sector is characterized by a 
medium level of dynamism. This resulted in a moderate level of competition and 
stable distributions of profits in the domestic market. Thanks to its mature technology 
and high productivity, Japan’s automobile sector traditionally enjoys high profitability. 
In 2001, Japan won a market share of 15.2 percent globally (Davis & Shirato, 2007, 
p.299). Politically speaking, the automobile sector and the steel sector constitute the 
backbone of Japan’s postwar catch-up strategy. Japan Automobile Manufactures 
Association (JAMA) functions as an intermediary between manufactures and 
government. Meanwhile, the automobile sector gives special attention to fostering 
favourable relations with leading political parties. In 2004, for example, its political 
contribution to the LDP was 285 million JPY (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p.288).  
 
Why the electronics manufacturing is chosen 
Japan’s electronics sector is characterized by a fragmented topography, with no 
company being the top runner. A host of companies vie for market share over a wide 
range of product lines. Among them, Fujisu, Hitachi, Masushita, Mitsubishi, NEC 
(Nippon Electronics Corporation), Sony, Toshiba and Sharp are the most well-known. 
This sector is noted for a very dynamic environment, fierce competition and short 
product lifecycle. Compared with the steel and automobile sector, Japan’s electronics 
manufacturers have an even higher level of dependence on export. In 2001, Japan’s 
electronics sector was the nation’s top export earner. It contributed to 24 percent of 
export value and 33 percent of export volume of that year. Meanwhile, it is also the 
nation’s biggest employer. In 2004, 17.6 percent of Japan’s labor force worked in the 
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electronics sector (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p. 288). Besides, it also contributes heftily 
to the LDP. In 2002, the political donations from the electronics sector amounted to 
225 million JPY (Davis & Shirato, 2007, p.288)  
 
Finally, I take a look at Japan’s actual performance in WTO-induced trade laws 
reform. Examination of Japan’s complainant activities at the WTO reveals an unusual 
concentration of case types. From 1995 to 2002, Japan in total filed 11 cases. Among 
them, 5 (DS162, DS184, DS217, DS244, DS249) were lodged for its steel industry 
and 6 (DS6, DS51, DS55, DS64, DS139, DS322) for its automobile sector. In 
comparison, Japan initiates no litigation for its electronics sector. This finding 
generally supports my hypothesis on the collaborative relation between corporate 
actors and government. Government, in this context, Japanese Government, tends to 
adopt WTO legalism on the interest of principle and foreign-oriented industrial 
sectors. However, it fails to clarify why the same pattern does not exist between the 
electronics sector and government. This provides the starting point of further research.  
 
6.5 Local norm systems  
In their essay discussing the rise of transnational governance, Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p.21) underline the facilitating role of normative systems in 
globalization. According to them, analyses of institutional changes should not only 
focus on perceptible interactions between organizations, but on nuanced influences 
from normative and cultural factors. Like many other factors in polycentric 
governance, almost all international organizations are value-laden. For member states, 
to gain access to an international organization requires the subscription to its value 
system. The compliance process, whether it be termed socialization (Djelic & 
Sahlin-Anderson, 2006, p. 31) or “norm nurturing” (Choukroune, 2012, p. 10), is an 
appropriation of international norms to domestic settings. During this process, 
international laws and regulations are “edited” and acquire local meaning. To 
understand them requires knowledge of local culture, history, economy and laws 
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(Biukovic, 2008, p. 803). How to explain China’ WTO-induced trade laws reforms in 
light of shifts of norms? What factors contribute to this change? This section aims to 
provide answers to these two questions. To do this, I employ the selective adaptation 
paradigm.  
 
The selective adaptation tries to explain a state’s compliance behaviour of 
international law/treaty by reference to domestic factors. It allows users to determine 
to what extent partial compliance or incompliance could be attributed to local cultural 
characteristics and legal tradition (Biukovic, 2008, p.803-p.804). It argues a state’s 
compliance with the WTO norms is dependant on several important factors. Among 
them, complementarity, political will, institutional capacity and legal culture are 
reckoned as the most important. In this research, complementary is used to denote 
whether the imported norm and local norm are complementary, viz. could coexist 
without conflicts. Political will is used to reflect whether political elites have the will 
to comply with international norms. Institutional capacity is used to reflect the 
efficiency of domestic political and legal system to implement imported norms.  
Local culture is used to reflect if local legal culture has the ability to absorb imported 
norms (Biukovic, 2008, p.805).   
 
In political science, norm is a concept with indefinite definitions. In this research, I 
adopt Cortell and Davis’ version: a norm is a prescription for actions in situations of 
choice. Norms give rise to a feeling of obligation. When being violated, it engenders 
regret or a feeling for justification (Cortell & Davis, 2005, p. 8). As an international 
legal regime for trade liberalization, WTO encompasses principles such as tariff 
reduction, elimination of non-tariff barriers, non-discrimination, etc. Three norms of 
liberal origin: transparency, national treatment and the rule of law form the base of 
WTO system (Potter, 2001, p.599).  
Analysis  
China  
Long before China’s accession to the WTO, researchers like Potter, Wolfe and Ostry 
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(as cited by Biukovic, 2008, p.809) had challenged China’s capacity to honour its 
WTO commitment. According to them, WTO norms like transparency and the rule of 
laws are grafted from Western liberal democracy and free market economy. These 
tenets echo very few indigenous practices in China. China is the home country of 
Confucianism, among whose creeds is harmony. Harmony is a widely upheld belief in 
China, which aims to achieve general welfare of society by enforcing interpersonal 
relationship. Legal culture in china traditionally does not encourage formal litigation 
through court system and shows a strong disdain on pettifoggers. In lieu of laws, it 
prompts the use of mediation to solve problems. This emphasis on informal, peaceful 
negotiation has far-reaching influence on the design and evolution of Chinese legal 
system.  
 
Authors like Fukuhama, Potter, Mayeda and Stein (Fukuhama, 2008, para.13, 
Biukovic, 2008, p.819) attribute China’s inadequacy in implementing the rule of law 
to historical reasons. According to them, political legacy from China’s feudalism past 
hinders China’s legal reforms. Fukuhama, for example, uses “paternalistic 
sovereignty” to describe China’s administration culture. The term is employed to 
capture a condescending relationship between state and subject. State is a patrimonial 
sovereign responsible for the welfare (especially material welfare) of society but not 
necessarily accountable for it. This asymmetrical arrangement of power is at odds 
with Western democracy and constitutes another obstacle to transparency and the rule 
of law.  
 
Finally, researchers like Lai (2010, p.827) and Kim (2002, p.441) focus on the 
distorted “guanxi” culture in China. Guanxi (关系) means building and maintaining 
favourable relation with powerful institutions (especially bureaucracy) to gain access 
to valued resources. These resources could be marketing intelligence, exemption from 
regulation or government procurement contract. As a matter of fact, many guanxi is 
simply bribery in the guise of PR. This practice highly privileges insiders and posts a 
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particular threat to new entrants, especially foreigners. 
  
In sum, the norm factors mentioned above could partly explain the lopsided nature of 
China’s post-WTO legal reform. Although China made some progresses in the last 
few years, China’s record in transparency and the rule of law is mediocre at the best. 
In 2012, China ranks 80 in the 176 countries surveyed by Transparency International’s  
Corruption Perception Index (“Corruption Perception Index”, 2012, “China”).  
China also fares poorly in The World Justice Project’s The Rule of Law Index. Out a 
scale from 0 to 1, China is scored at 0.35 (“Rule of Law Index Map,” 2012, “China”).  
 
Japan  
Analysis  
Japan is an Asian country that values solidarity and collaboration. Norms like 
consensus and harmony are granted high priority in regulating Japanese society. Civil 
and merchant disputes, for example, used to be solved mainly by informal 
mechanisms (Biukovic, 2008, p.813).  
 
In terms of administration culture, there is also a far cry between Japanese tradition 
and the rule of law. Although an Asian pioneer to modernize its national economy, 
Japan is questioned as a modern state under the genuine rule of law. As the first Asian 
constitutional monarchy, Japan enacted Meiji Constitution in 1890. Unlike its western 
counterpart trying to constrain the oligarchy, it institutionalized the unchallengeable 
authority of Mikado. Although the emperor formally relinquished his divinity in 1945, 
many practices rooted in Tennoism remained in Japan’s administrative culture. One 
example is the high standing of bureaucracy, which seldom opens its operations and 
documents to legal scrutiny. As a result, administrate review is very rare (Biukovic, 
2008, p.813). Japanese administration also relies heavily on informal guidelines to 
regulate business and trade. These semiofficial rules are not decree in nature, but 
potent enough to distort free market economy (Biukovic, 2008, p. 813).  
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Finally, some traditional beliefs also account for Japan’s incomplete observance of 
GATT/WTO laws and failed legal reform. These presumptive norms anchor in the 
core of Japan’s value system and are very difficult to change. In this respect, one 
example is mercantilism, which helps explain Japan’s protectionist stance on domestic 
rice production.  
 
When Japan joined the GATT in 1955, it had a reservation about Article X, which 
mandates the liberalization of agricultural trade. This is an archetypical case of 
selective adaptation. According to Yoshimura and Anderson (1997, p.207), Japan has 
a culture deeply affected by traditional behaviour. Japanese feel a pressing obligation 
to keep things stable and are very resistant to change. From the 19th century onwards, 
mercantilism began to figure prominently in Japan’s foreign trade policies. Japan is an 
island country deprived of natural resources. Meanwhile, its domestic market is small.  
Mercantilism argues for government’s heavy regulation of economy and strict 
limitation of import. These ideas particularly appeal to many Japanese with insularity 
(Biukovic, 2008, p.814). This mercantilist mindset also leads to Japan’s position on 
agriculture by stressing the importance of self-sufficiency.  
 
In sum, the aforementioned local cultural, historical and institutional factors could 
partly explain Japan’s problematic adherence to WTO norms. As a consequence, 
Japan is frequently faulted by other WTO members for overregulation of trade and 
lack of transparency in legislations (Biukovic, 2008, p.814).  
 
Conclusion  
7.1 Answering the research question 
As the research nearing its end, it is time to answer the research question. To what 
extent does China’s accession to the WTO lead to domestic legal reform? My answer 
is: China’s admission into the WTO functions mainly as an exogenous disciplining 
mechanism for its internal trade regime reform. China attempts to facilitate its 
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transition to market economy by emerging into world trading system. For Chinese 
leaders, the WTO also functions as an institutional constraint. It guarantees China’s 
forthcoming reforms stay in an officially approved, internationally endorsed track in 
the years to come. China’s decision to join the WTO is at the initiative of Chinese 
leaders. In this sense, WTO does not constitute an impingement on traditional state 
sovereignty. One example concerns the ruling of the Permanent Court of International 
Court of Justice in the Wimbledon case (as cited by Wang, 2004, p. 477). It reads as 
follows: “ … any conventions creating an obligation of this kind place a restriction 
upon the exercise of sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to 
be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international engagement 
is an attribute of State sovereignty.” In sum, this finding corroborates my central 
argument, viz., China’s accession to the WTO constitutes a necessary, albeit crucial 
condition for China’s trade regime reform.  
  
7.2 Generalization of the research findings 
Basing on the multiple causality mechanism, this paper expands the scope of research 
and probes the influence of national and subnational factors. Four causal variables: 
state preferences, costs of entry, corporate actors and local norm systems are chosen 
for their prominence in this legalization process. Below is a generalization of the most 
important findings from the research.  
 
State preferences  
At state level, comparative study on China and Japan’s administrative records lends 
strong support to Jacobson’s statement about the duality of modern state. According to 
him, states increasingly turn to both regulators and being regulated in the 
transnational governance networks (Djelic & Sahlin- Andersson, 2006, p.246). State is 
the seat of authority in endorsing and implementing international laws and rules. In 
China and Japan, state authorities still monopolies the right to change current legal 
systems through their legislative branch. State preferences is a crucial factor in legal 
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reform. It could be translated to priority of legal reform, scope of legal reform and 
efficiency of legal reform. A Comparison of China with Japan’s financial service 
reform demonstrates three is a positive correlation between preexistent political 
agenda and legal reform. In China, it is Chinese leaders’ intention to employ WTO 
legal reform to galvanize its ailing financial sector. In Japan, the Big Bang carried out 
to fulfill Japan’s GATS obligation also helps alleviate its chronic macroeconomic 
crisis. 
 
Costs of entry  
In this research, I invent a layered model to appraise the impact of adaptation costs on 
prospective legal reform. Ranged in a descending order from political through 
institutional to economic level, this stratification design aims to concretize diverse 
costs. Rational choice theory argues that there is a reverse correlation between 
adaptation costs and legal reform. In other words, if membership of an international 
organization overburdens a state, then in all likelihood legal reforms will not take 
place. This may be due to widespread conflicts of interests. State caught in this 
situation either does lip service to create a façade of reform or petitions for incomplete 
reforms. Juxtaposition of adaptation costs in China and Japan reveals significant 
disparity in terms of scope and magnitude. In the case of China, agriculture, 
manufacturing and service sector were expected to face a hard time in the initial years 
after its WTO accession. Meanwhile, China faces the task to revamp its institutional 
infrastructure and constitutional order. In the case of Japan, costs of entry concerns 
mainly its fragile agriculture sector, which counts for only a fraction of national 
economy. Theory suggests Japan should make more progresses in legal reform but 
reality shows China is relatively more efficient in this regard. For this discrepancy, I 
focus on China and Japan’s sensitivities towards factional interests. China is an 
authoritarian state where the dominance of CPC on legislature makes trade laws 
reform immune from conflicting interests. In democracy like Japan where the 
administration is more answerable to the constituency, political parties need the five 
million votes of the JA for survival.  
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Corporate actors  
I consider corporate actors the primary factor at subnational level which has a say in 
WTO-induced trade laws reforms. My research echoes Engawall’s assertion (Djelic & 
Andersson, 2006, p. 161) that corporate actors increasingly use different 
intermediaries in their interactions with counterparts exercising regulatory authorities. 
Compared with their predecessors two decades ago, corporate actors in China are 
endowed more autonomy in management and marketing. In this research, a 
consortium of corporations in China challenged the validity of EU ruling with the aid 
of other players. They include: administrative organ at national level and law form at 
international level. This is an example par excellence of polycentric governance due 
to the interconnectedness of players in the field. In the case of Japan, export-oriented 
industries’ interest in trade liberalization partly accounts for Japan’s alignment with 
WTO legalism.  
 
Local norm systems  
In the study of transnational governance, territories, interactions and relationships are 
relatively easy to observe and measure. In contrast, cultural frames and patterns of 
meaning are more complex to capture (Djelic & Andersson, 2006, p.21). As norms 
travel, local “editing” process and its various relational and structural filters should 
also be scrutinize (Djelic & Andersson, 2006, p. 69). The final part of this report 
explains WTO-induced trade laws reforms in light of interplays between imported and 
local norms. By utilizing the selective adaptation paradigm, this research reveals some 
striking similarities between China and Japan.  
 
Firstly, the geographic proximity between China and Japan results in a strong 
presence of Confucianism in these two countries. The “harmony” doctrine speaks 
volumes about China and Japan’s legal cultures and contravenes the rule of law. 
Secondly, China’s feudalism and Japan’s Tennoism make an indelible imprint on the 
two countries’ administrative culture and practice. The so-called paternalistic 
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sovereignty is believed to impair regulatory transparency and accountability. As a 
result, China and Japan are frequently faulted for lack of administrative transparency 
and overregulation of economy. Finally, if we view WTO-induced trade laws reforms 
in terms of norms replacement, then this is usually a lengthy task. Prevalent practice 
(“Guanxi” in China) or mindset (mercantilism in Japan) is usually ingrained in a 
society’s collective choice and is thus self-reinforcing.  
 
7.3 Limitation of the research and research potential of this topic in 
future  
According to Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p.18), three are three perspectives 
collectively forming the transnational research repertoire. They are the actor-centered 
approach, the process-centered approach and institutionalism. The actor-centered 
approach focuses on tangible elements of transnational governance such as actors, 
initiatives and interactions between powers. The process-centered approach tries to 
dissect the transnational governance by unveiling its internal dynamics. Finally, 
institutionalism identifies culture and social custom as important formative factors. 
This research project is mainly conducted in line with the actor-centered approach, 
although the forth causal variable – the local norm system also addresses partly the 
concern of institutionalism. The actor-centered “lens” limits the utility of this research 
because factors are examined in a relatively static and disconnected way. Future study 
on the same topic could grant more attention to the conditionality of these actors. One 
example is “Under what condition does variable X maximize the effects of 
WTO-induced legal reform?” In doing so, causal mechanisms between variables can 
be mapped in a more precise way.  
 
The major policy implications of this comparative research comprise of two parts. 
The first one is methodological in nature. This research generally acknowledges the 
facilitating roles of divergent factors in WTO-induced trade laws reforms. However, 
there remains the question of how to measure their respective contribution. Perusals 
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of monographs of multilevel governance reveal a dearth of insight in this regard. How 
to quantify the significance of different factors and justify the measurement 
mechanism are two challenging tasks in the years to come. 
 
The second policy implication concerns the role of education in WTO-induced trade 
laws reforms. As mentioned earlier, WTO-related legal reform could be understood as 
a substitution of old norms with new ones. Due to the ingrain nature of old norms 
system, the establishment of new norms cannot be achieved overnight. Policy makers 
can nevertheless speed up the diffusion of new norms by granting more attention to 
the inculcating roles of education. The Japanese initiative to overhaul its legal 
education system in the wake of its WTO accession is one example in point (Biukovic, 
2008, p.817). 
 
7.4 Final remark  
The World Trade Organization is a creation of globalization and propeller of 
globalization. It is an ideal subject of research for scholar interested in the rise and 
evolvement of transnational governance. As an organization embodying liberal 
principles of trade, the WTO may affect its member states’ trade regime in a multitude 
of ways. This paper aims to explain China’s trade legal reforms against the backdrop 
of its entry into the WTO. Viewed through the lens of multilevel governance theory, 
China’s trade regime reforms exemplify the modern definition of governance. Study 
on state preferences and costs of entry attribute China’s trade legal reforms to the 
interplay between domestic and foreign policies. Study on corporate actors 
acknowledges the rising importance of business in national legislation. Finally, study 
on local norm systems underlines the constraining effects of indigenous value systems 
in the reforms. Transnational governance, an amorphous process under the sway of 
multiple factors, finds a good example in China.  
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